This research project investigates the impact of criminalising irregular migration as a deterrence strategy in Europe.
Governments throughout Europe are putting more and more emphasis on addressing irregular migration. They often aim to prevent – or deter – migration.
An often-used, yet seldom-evaluated, deterrence measure is the criminalisation of migration. This refers to the introduction of a crime of irregular migration, to address foreigners’ irregular entry or stay.
In this project, I study the consequences of criminalising migration in two of the EU member states with the highest sanctions: Italy and France.
Migration and deterrence
Deterrence is a strategy to discourage irregular migration to a country, through potential migrants’ fear of negative consequences.
Deterrence is based on the idea of rationality and assumes that people act by calculating the costs and benefits of their actions.
The expectation is that if the sanctions for irregular migration (such as fines or prison terms) are made more severe, it will be costlier for people to move, so they refrain from doing so.
However, I argue that deterrence, in the field of migration, suffers from several shortcomings:
- Deterrence targets the symptoms of irregular migration but is unable to address its root causes, the first of which are economic factors and conflict.
- Deterrence causes “balloon effects” - re-directing migration flows to other entry points, rather than stopping migration altogether.
- When policymakers use deterrence to address the concerns of the domestic public (rather than migrants’), they end up designing inconsistent policies.
- Policymakers often overestimate migrants’ knowledge of migration policies in destination countries.
The ineffectiveness of criminalisation
Using Italy and France as case studies, and relying on previously unreleased data and interviews, I find that criminalisation has no effect on migratory flows.
In both countries, criminalisation failed to:
- increase expulsions, and
- deter migration.
Instead, criminalisation led to multiple negative repercussions, leading to more, rather than less, insecurity, and lengthening investigations against traffickers.
My research also reveals that migrants’ information is often overestimated. Conducting a questionnaire with over 100 migrants in Italy and France, I found that two-thirds of respondents were not aware of鈥痑ny鈥痮f the sanctions for unauthorised migration (detention, fines, etc.).
Migrants acquired most of their information through personal networks (like family, friends, or smugglers), rather than the internet.
Importantly, the few migrants who did know about sanctions, only learned about them once they arrived in Europe.
Alternatives to deterrence
Given the counterproductive and damaging effects of criminalisation, moving away from the idea of deterrence is crucial.
Revoking the crime of migration, which as I show in the research is both ineffective and counterproductive, is the first key step.
More broadly, we need to leave the deterrence paradigm behind and focus on long-term solutions to the structural drivers of migration.
Finally, more legal pathways are needed, for both refugee and labour migration alike.
Publications